The Structure and Financing of the Chilean Health Care System by Rutigliano, Melissa
Lehigh University
Lehigh Preserve
Chile in transition Perspectives on Business and Economics
1-1-1999
The Structure and Financing of the Chilean Health
Care System
Melissa Rutigliano
Lehigh University
Follow this and additional works at: http://preserve.lehigh.edu/perspectives-v17
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Perspectives on Business and Economics at Lehigh Preserve. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Chile in transition by an authorized administrator of Lehigh Preserve. For more information, please contact preserve@lehigh.edu.
Recommended Citation
Rutigliano, Melissa, "The Structure and Financing of the Chilean Health Care System" (1999). Chile in transition. Paper 2.
http://preserve.lehigh.edu/perspectives-v17/2
THE STRUCTURE AND FINANCING 
OF THE CHILEAN HEALTH CARE 
SYSTEM 
Melissa Rutigliano 
Introduction 
Health care is not merely an economic 
issue. Properly functioning health care sys-
tems are essential to the overall well-being of 
a country's citizens. Citizens may feel very 
vulnerable when illness and injury occur, and 
as a result they may blindly entrust a health 
care provider with decisions that may affect 
their future health and financial stability. In 
their role as protector and promoter of health, 
health care systems can provide citizens with 
a sense of security. A health care system can 
provide security for citizens by ensuring that 
they will have access to adequate and afford-
able care in times of need. Nevertheless, 
health care can be a source of potential dis-
content when citizens fear that they may not 
have access to adequate and affordable health 
care. This discontent can persist regardless 
of a country's general health status. (Lechner) 
With the true importance of health care 
in mind, governments, payers, and providers 
3 
must address issues sensitive to the needs of 
citizens as well as financial issues required to 
contain rising health care costs. For citizens, 
some major health care issues involve ade-
quate access, quality, affordability, and flexi-
bility in choosing a provider. For govern-
ments, payers, and providers, some major 
health care issues involve allocation of funds, 
provision of services, extent of coverage for 
services, cost-efficient resource utilization, 
technology acquisition, and quality assurance. 
Some of the issues paramount for govern-
ments, payers, and providers may conflict 
with the issues important to citizens. For 
instance, the issue of containing health care 
costs can involve limits in access, quality, and 
flexibility. (Fefer et al., p. 343) 
Different countries have developed 
diverse methods to approach these health care 
issues. In the United States, health care is a 
privatized system. Private insurance compa-
nies provide a means for U.S. citizens to cover 
the costs of care. In theory, the market should 
drive down prices and improve quality as 
providers and payers compete for beneficiaries 
in the private system. Nevertheless, the cost 
of health care in the United States is growing 
more rapidly than the rate of inflation. 
(Rutigliano) Managed care has evolved as a 
tool to help control the cost of care in the 
United States. The different types of managed 
care balance limitations on flexibility and serv-
ice utilization with lower costs. The more flex-
ible the program and the more services pro-
vided, the more expensive the program will be. 
The U.S. government provides Medicaid cov-
erage to ensure care for the impoverished and 
Medicare coverage to help the elderly cope 
with high-priced care. Medicaid and Medicare 
are financed through taxes on U.S. citizens. 
A very different approach to health care 
was established in England in 1948. In the 
U.K., health care is nationalized. The system, 
known as the National Health Service, is 
financed through taxes. All citizens of the 
U.K. are entitled to free services under the 
National Health Service. Though most hos-
pitals are public, private care is available for 
those who can afford it. The U.K. spends 
seven percent of its GOP on health care, only 
about half of what the United States spends. 
This restricted budget has produced limited 
services with out-of-date technology and inad-
equate staffing of clinics and hospitals. In 
1991, reforms called for the decentralization 
of financing to the local level. As a result of 
these reforms, hospitals now have the respon-
sibility to direct funds and resources to fit the 
needs of the patients. With this localized 
management, the government hopes compe-
tition will arise between public hospitals. 
(Santelmann, p. 42) In Chile, health care is a 
hybrid of private and public care. The private 
system is mirrored after the system of private 
insurance companies in the United States, and 
the public system is mirrored after the 
National Health Service in England. 
In this article, I first provide a historical 
background of health care in Chile leading up 
to the creation of the current hybrid system of 
public and private care. I then discuss the cur-
rent structure and financing of the public and 
private health care systems, the advantages of 
the two systems, the problems faced by the 
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public and private systems, and reforms and 
proposals within the systems. I conclude with 
an analysis of the future of health care in Chile 
and a statement about features essential to 
properly functioning health care systems. 
A Brief History of Health Care in 
Chile 
In 1924 the Chilean government created 
the first national health insurance plan for 
workers. Chile was the first country in the 
Western Hemisphere to institute such a plan. 
Several years later, this plan evolved into sepa-
rate plans for white-collar and blue-collar work-
ers. Sermena (National Medical Service for 
White-Collar Workers) was initiated by the gov-
ernment as a health insurance plan in 1938 to 
provide comprehensive health care for white-
collar workers, and the National Health Service 
(modeled after the British system) was created 
in 1952 for blue-collar workers. Reorganization 
of these plans in 1979 allowed all workers the 
freedom to choose facilities under either 
Sermena or the National Health Service. Like 
the British system, private care has always exist-
ed in Chile for citizens able to afford its high 
cost. From the 1930s through the 1980s, semi-
private health care plans, known as cajas, exist-
ed to supplement or replace the plans of work-
ers. The individual cajas were prepaid medical 
plans designed for specific groups of workers 
(such as bankers). The cajas offered services 
that were a step above public services in quali-
ty yet less expensive than private services. The 
cajas were semi-private due to heavy regulation 
by the Chilean government and partial financ-
ing through a subsidy from the Chilean gov-
ernment. Cajas were also the precursor to 
Isapres (private insurance companies) created 
during the reorganization of the 1980s. 
(Kritzer, p. 17) With the rise of the National 
Health Service in 1952 and the growing empha-
sis on public care, private care expenditures 
began decreasing. This decrease in private 
expenditure continued until the coup d'etat in 
1973. (Scarpaci, pp. 223-26) 
During the period of military rule under 
Pinochet, expenditures on public care rapidly 
decreased from 3.5 percent of GDP to 0.6 per-
cent of GDP. ("Public Health Improvement. .. ") 
During the "wave of privatization" under 
Pinochet in the 1980s, the health care system of 
Chile underwent a reorganization into its cur-
rent form. First, this reorganization resulted in 
the decentralization of the National Health 
Service into what is now known as the National 
Health Service System (NHSS). Second, the 
reorganization established Fonasa to adminis-
ter and distribute financial resources to the 
NHSS. Finally, the reorganization resulted in 
the creation of Isapres. The current relationship 
between the private and public sectors of the 
Chilean health care system is complex. The pri-
vate and public systems function largely as inde-
pendent entities; however, some interdepen-
dence between the two systems is seen through 
the exchange of services. (World Bank, pp. 1-2) 
The Structure of the Public System 
The highest bureaucratic level in the pub-
lic health care system is the Ministry of Health 
(MOH). As a branch of Chile's central govern-
ment, the MOH has primarily bureaucratic 
responsibilities, such as forming policies, pro-
grams, and standards for the public health care 
system. The Subsecretariat of Health of the 
MOH manages five major agencies under the 
administration of the MOH: the National Health 
Service System (NHSS), Fonasa, the Central 
Supply Facility (which obtains and distributes 
medical supplies, food supplements, and phar-
maceuticals), the Institute of Public Health 
(which monitors the quality of food and phar-
maceuticals), and the Superintendency of 
Isapres (which oversees the operation of 
Isapres). (World Bank, p. 3) 
The National Health Service System is the 
current version of the decentralized National 
Health Service. As of 1997, 60-70 percent of all 
Chileans were enrolled as beneficiaries of the 
NHSS. ("Fonasa to Compete ... ") The NHSS is 
composed of 26 Health Service Areas. The 
Health Service Areas are responsible for execut-
ing the policies, standards, and programs that 
originated in the MOH; however, the Health 
Service Areas are allotted only limited authority 
to alter decisions made by the MOH. Each 
Health Service Area is also responsible for man-
agement of the public hospitals within its defined 
region as well as supervision over primary care 
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system facilities within its region. Public hospi-
tals offer both outpatient and inpatient care and 
fall under one of four categories according to 
their location (rural versus urban) and level of 
technology. The primary care system is man-
aged by municipalities and consists of urban and 
rural health clinics and rural health posts that 
vary according to the level of technology offered 
at the facilities. (World Bank, pp. 3-10) 
Fonasa is a financial institution that dis-
tributes the funds of the NHSS. In addition, 
Fonasa maintains a Preferred Provider System 
(PPS) form of managed health care. Thirteen 
percent of Chileans benefit from Fonasa's PPS. 
Fonasa's PPS allows beneficiaries more flexi-
bility since they are provided access to private 
facilities within the PPS network in addition to 
access to all public facilities. Chileans who elect 
to use the private facilities within the PPS net-
work must provide a co-payment that is set for 
particular services. Fonasa sells vouchers that 
beneficiaries of the PPS can buy to cover their 
co-pay. These vouchers are redeemed by 
providers for services. (World Bank, pp. 4-5) 
The Current Financing of the Public 
Health Care System 
As the financial arm of the public health 
care system, Fonasa is responsible for the distri-
bution of funds to the NHSS. The finances 
administered by Fonasa arise from several dif-
ferent sources. The two largest sources of funds 
are the seven percent payroll deduction, equiva-
lent to a flat income tax for health care coverage, 
and contributions provided by the Ministry of 
Finance, a branch of the central government. 
1\vo other sources of funds are the sale of vouch-
ers for Fonasa's PPS and the co-pay for services 
in public hospitals. The amount of co-pay 
required for services in the public hospitals 
depends on a citizen's income but can be no less 
than 40 percent of the cost of services for citizens 
able to pay. ("Fonasa to Compete ... ") No co-pay 
is required for services provided in the primary 
care system. In addition to these funds, individ-
ual hospitals or municipalities within the NHSS 
can apply for funds from the National Regional 
Development Fund (FNDR) and the Social Fund 
(SF) to help finance investments in new tech-
nology and equipment. (World Bank, p. 5) 
Fonasa allocates these funds to the public 
hospitals and municipalities that comprise the 
NHSS. The public hospitals are reimbursed on 
a fee-for-service basis. The prices for services 
provided by public hospitals are set by Fonasa. 
This fee-for-service funding covers most hospi-
tal operating expenses. Fonasa also provides a 
separate public hospital budget to cover the 
salaries of workers in addition to most invest-
ments. Public hospitals also receive funding 
from services contracted with !sap res. The 
prices for these contracted services are set by 
the public hospitals. These prices can differ 
from the prices set by Fonasa for services to 
patients of the public system. Like public hos-
pitals, municipalities were once funded through 
a fee-for-service system. As of 1997, munici-
palities have been funded by Fonasa on a per 
capita basis. This new system finances munic-
ipalities based upon the average number of 
patients the primary care clinics have examined 
over the past two years. ("Financial Crisis in 
Clinics ... ") Municipalities also have their own 
budget, which is set by the Ministry of Finance. 
This budget is an additional source of revenue 
for the municipalities. Each municipality is 
responsible for investment in new technology 
and equipment. Funding for such investments 
comes from the municipal budgets. 
Municipalities may also apply for additional 
funding from the SF or the FNDR to cover the 
cost of investments. (World Bank, pp. 5-6) 
Advantages and Problems of the 
Public System 
The general advantages of the public 
health care system include universality, orga-
nization, and the integrated role of the state in 
the provision of health care. The universality 
of public health care ensures that all citizens 
will receive health care coverage regardless of 
their income level. The organizational hierar-
chy of the public system aids the flow of 
resources to providers and services to benefi-
ciaries. Additionally, decentralization of the 
NHSS in the 1980s has allowed the public 
health care system to improve care to fit local 
needs. (Scarpaci, p. 234) The role of the state 
in public health care is to ensure quality, access, 
and efficiency through health care policies and 
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programs. The state can also help control the 
cost of care by setting the prices for services in 
the public system. (Fefer, et al., p. 345) 
Despite these advantages, the public sys-
tem is not without its problems. Most of the 
problems faced by the public system relate to 
financing issues. During the decentralization 
of the 1980s, primary care clinics began to be 
managed by municipalities. Until1997, munic-
ipalities were funded on a fee-for-service basis. 
Early problems with the primary care clinics can 
be attributed to the fee-for-service financing sys-
tem. For example, clinics would sometimes 
report a purposely inflated number of primary 
care exams, which are reimbursed at a higher 
rate than non-primary care services, to increase 
revenue. Early attempts to counteract this prob-
lem included a ceiling on the number of prima-
ry care exams performed, as well as guidelines 
describing what precisely constituted a prima-
ry care exam. The change to per capita funding 
of municipalities in 1997 has been the most 
recent attempt at a solution to the problems 
with primary care clinics. The mayors of munic-
ipalities have claimed that the switch from fee-
for-service to per capita funding has reduced 
municipality funding by 20 percent. ("Financial 
Crisis in Clinics ... ") These limitations on fund-
ing demand that municipalities use cost-effec-
tive services and eliminate unnecessary services. 
Another early problem with the public system 
involved inadequate reimbursement of munic-
ipalities for services provided in clinics. The 
inadequacy of reimbursement compromised the 
ability of clinics to provide sufficient care. 
(Scarpaci, pp. 234-35) 
The most significant problem in the public 
health care system today is underfunding. 
Underfunding affects both health care workers 
and patients. The discontent among health care 
workers in public hospitals and primary care 
clinics can be seen through the numerous strikes 
and strike threats over inadequate salary budgets 
and resources. For example, in September 1997 
the municipalities threatened to relinquish con-
trol of primary care clinics to the national level 
if funding was not increased. The mayors of the 
municipalities claimed that they did not have 
adequate funds to continue running their clin-
ics. ("Municipalities Cannot Return ... ") It is 
likely that the switch to per capita financing of 
municipalities contributed to this underfunding. 
("Financial Crisis in Clinics ... ") 
The underfunding of the public health 
care system also has an impact on patients. 
Without adequate funds, facilities deteriorate, 
resources are over-stretched, and technology 
investments are limited. Resource scarcity has 
subsequently resulted in low quality service and 
long waiting lists for most procedures. Long 
waiting periods exist even for basic services, 
such as primary care exams. Though the exams 
may be brief, patients with morning appoint-
ments at clinics may wait all day to see a doc-
tor. ("Underfunding at Health ... ") According 
to Sergio Aguilo, the Health Commission Chair 
for the Chilean government, the major com-
plaint from both doctors and users of the pub-
lic system is that resources are so scarce that 
facilities sometimes do not have proper or basic 
medications. (Aguilo) One example of the 
effects of resource scarcity in the public system 
occurred in June 1996, when delays in funding 
resulted in a shortage of beds in children's hos-
pitals. The bed scarcity came at the time of 
Chile's traditional winter health crisis, when 
many children suffer from severe respiratory 
diseases. During this time, a Doctors' Union 
survey of six public hospitals found no beds in 
the intensive care units and only four in the 
other wards. ("Beds Are Scarce ... ") 
The lack of funds within the public health 
care system is further exacerbated by cost shift-
ing from the private system. Isapres often 
reject high-risk and, thus, high-cost beneficia-
ries or increase the premiums for these benefi-
ciaries. As a result, these costly beneficiaries 
are often "dumped" into the public health care 
system. The disproportionate number of cost-
ly patients in the public system thus places a 
significant financial burden on public care. 
According to Alex Figueroa, the current Health 
Minister, Isapres will often not pay the costs 
when private beneficiaries cross over to public 
hospitals in emergencies. Sometimes private 
beneficiaries may even cross over to the public 
system and deny that they have Isapre cover-
age. In both cases, the public health care sys-
tem pays the bill. Since both public and private 
patients benefit from public emergency care, 
the president of the Santiago Medical 
Association, Ricardo Pena, has suggested that 
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a new fund be established for emergency care 
and that this fund be supported through con-
tributions from beneficiaries of both the private 
and public health care systems. ("Medical 
Association Fears ... ") 
Another important aspect of the under-
funding problem involves management. 
Inefficient management of funds and resources 
can lead to resource shortages. Many problems 
with the current management in the public 
health care system have further aggravated the 
public system's underfunded state. One man-
agement problem involves the price list set by 
Fonasa for services provided in public hospi-
tals. The price list is not based upon the full 
costs for providing services (some resource 
inputs are not included in the total price of 
services). Additionally, the prices for services 
have not kept pace with inflation. ("Public 
Health Care Charges ... ") The public system 
loses needed funds when the prices for services 
are set too low. A potential solution for the 
price list problem is to allow prices to change 
with the rate of inflation and to more closely 
match the prices with actual production costs. 
(World Bank, p. 123) 
Another problem of management involves 
the classification system for income levels used 
to determine which patients must pay user fees 
in public hospitals. Due to a lack of information 
on the incomes of many Chilean citizens, the 
current classification system may not be accu-
rate. As a result, many Chileans may be falsely 
classified as having lower incomes than they have 
in reality; therefore, a disproportionate number 
of Chileans are exempt from paying user fees. As 
of 1989, 76 percent of Chileans using the public 
system were classified as exempt from paying 
user fees. (World Bank, p. 124) Again, the pub-
lic system loses a source of needed funds when 
a disproportionate number of Chileans are 
exempted from the co-payment in public hospi-
tals. The potential solution to the problems with 
the classification system is to devise a scheme, 
based upon regularly updated information on 
Chileans' incomes, that will accurately gauge the 
ability of a citizen to pay the user fees in public 
hospitals. (World Bank, p. 124) 
Another area where public hospitals lose 
funds is through accident insurance. The 
Association for the Aid and Transit of Accident 
Victims claimed that public hospitals have lost 
U.S. $37 million in revenues over the last four 
years because of failure to collect on accident 
insurance. ("Medical Association Fears ... ") 
Improvements in public hospital administra-
tion, such as in accounting and billing, could 
help public hospitals recover revenue. 
Management problems in public hospitals 
can also be attributed to the current fee-for-serv-
ice reimbursement system. The fee-for-service 
system gives providers an incentive to increase 
the quantity of services provided, regardless of 
demand, in order to receive a higher level of 
reimbursement from Fonasa. This results in 
poor resource utilization and escalating health 
care costs. The MOH has begun designing a new 
system for financing the public hospitals. The 
proposed system is based upon a diagnostic 
related group (DRG) method of payment. The 
DRG method depends upon predetermined costs 
for defined groups of diagnostic and therapeu-
tic services required for specific illnesses. 
Essentially, the DRG method limits the level of 
reimbursement public hospitals can receive 
based upon each case. The proposed system also 
includes a change that would combine the DRG 
reimbursements with the salary budget for 
health workers. Each public hospital would be 
required to pay its own staff from the DRG reim-
bursements. The purpose of this proposed sys-
tem of payment is to eliminate unnecessary care 
and encourage the use of cost -effective services. 
(World Bank, pp. 125-28) 
In an effort to improve the overall man-
agement of the public system by making man-
agement of services more responsive to local 
needs, the government has proposed decen-
tralizing all administrative authority from the 
MOH to the 26 Health Service Areas. The 
MOH's new role would involve monitoring the 
provision and quality of services administered 
by Health Service Areas. (World Bank, p. 130) 
Even government and health care officials who 
argue for improved resource management gen-
erally agree that funding for the public system 
needs to be increased. 
Additional problems with the public sys-
tem include limited flexibility and access. 
Beneficiaries of the public system are restrict-
ed to using only public facilities, unless they are 
members of Fonasa's PPS. Transfer of patients 
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to private facilities is only allowed during strikes 
in the public system and, in certain cases, to 
reduce waiting lists. ("Fonasa to Compete ... ") 
A further issue with public care is limited 
access. Restrictions in access can be thought 
of in terms of the extensive waiting lists and 
long waiting periods that are characteristic of 
public facilities. Restrictions in access can also 
be thought of in terms of the limited care avail-
able in rural areas. In some geographically iso-
lated areas, residents may have ready access 
only to rural health posts, which can only offer 
preventative care due to low level technology. 
(Herrera and Ringeling, pp. 8-9) On Easter 
Island, for example, there is only one medical 
center to serve all of its 2, 770 residents. ("Easter 
Island Receives ... "; Dr. Grant McCall) 
Reforms and Proposals 
In March 1990, Chile underwent the tran-
sition from a military to a democratic govern-
ment. (World Bank, p. 13) Unfortunately, 
Pinochet's military government left its democ-
ratic successors with a dilapidated public health 
care system, due to years of gross underfunding 
and inefficient management of resources. In 
general, the reforms and proposals of the 1990s 
have been directed at rebuilding and revamping 
the public health care system, through address-
ing the problems discussed previously. 
Social spending rose slowly during the early 
nineties. ("Social Spending ... ") With increased 
spending came the increased development of 
social programs. One social program developed 
in 1996 was the Support for Priority Areas 
Program. This program assists poor and rural 
areas through funding for preventative medicine 
and health education campaigns. ("PDC 
President Calls ... ") Two additional improve-
ments of the public system in 1996 included the 
introduction of a credit card for beneficiaries of 
the public system and the introduction of a com-
plaints service. The credit card makes it easier 
for patients to pay their co-pay for services in 
public hospitals, thereby allowing beneficiaries 
easier access to services. ("Health Care System 
to Undergo ... ") The complaints service creates 
a system that can formally address problems 
experienced by users of public facilities. 
In 1997 the budget for health care rose 
again, up six percent from 1996. ("Public Health 
Improvement. .. ") Additional increases in fund-
ing were proposed through a controversial 
announcement by the Health Minister, Alex 
Figueroa, to eliminate the two percent subsidy 
of Isapres. ("Government Unveils ... ") The two 
percent subsidy allows many Chileans with 
lower incomes access to Isapres. Several /sap res 
claim that elimination of the subsidy will flood 
the public system with lower income beneficia-
ries, thus causing the collapse of the public sys-
tem. ("Fonasa to Compete ... ") Aside from fund-
ing increases, another improvement in 1997 
reduced the waiting period for treatment of 20 
priority illnesses to three months. After three 
months, the plan requires that Fonasa contract 
private providers for services. ("Public Health 
Improvement ... ") Additionally, in 1997 two 
years of negotiations between health care work-
ers and the MOH resulted in an agreement by 
the MOH to increase salaries, improve public 
hospitals, and increase job stability for health 
care workers ("Health Workers Reach ... "). 
The most controversial reform proposed in 
1997 centered on increasing flexibility in the co-
pay system and allowing patients of the public 
system access to both private and public facili-
ties. This reform was to be financed through the 
elimination of the two percent subsidy of Isapres. 
Currently, the co-pay for services in public hos-
pitals is a minimum of 40 percent of the cost of 
service. This minimum limits the flexibility of 
the co-pay system. The reform increases flexi-
bility in the co-pay system by allowing Fonasa to 
increase coverage on a case by case basis. 
("Fonasa to Compete ... ") By increasing flexibil-
ity, as much as 60 percent of co-payments could 
be eliminated. ("Fonasa Director Resigns") The 
most controversial aspect of the reform involved 
the section that allowed the public system to con-
tract services from private providers on a regu-
lar basis. Though access to private facilities 
allows patients of the public system greater flex-
ibility, many municipal health workers and doc-
tors were angered with the potential of intro-
ducing greater privatization in public care. The 
argument from health care workers centered on 
the fear that the health care system would 
become too market-oriented. As of August 1998, 
the reform had not yet been proposed before 
Congress. ("Professionals Attack ... ") 
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In 1998 the main issue in the public 
health care system debate was the decree 
signed by President Frei in July to cut U.S. $19 
million from the health care budget. 
Government spending cuts were made across 
the board in the wake of the Asian economic 
crisis. About one-third of Chile's exports and 
one-half of Chile's copper exports go to Asia. 
("Frei Signs Budget. .. ") As a result, Chile's 
economy felt the impact of the difficulties in 
Asia during 1998. The health care budget cuts 
came out of funds set aside for future health 
programs. Additionally, the health care bud-
get for 1998 was U.S. $110 million higher than 
in 1997. Consequently, a U.S. $19 million cut 
still left the budget U.S. $91 million higher 
than in 1997. ("Tension Mounts ... ") 
Nevertheless, many health care workers and 
leaders remained outraged. ("Frei Signs 
Budget. .. ") The current president of the 
Medical Association, Enrique Accorsi, stated 
that health care budget cuts would result in 
layoffs of health care workers, despite the 
promise that the cuts were limited to future 
programs. ("Medical Associations Reject ... ") 
The Structure of the Private System 
Though the public system provides care 
for the majority of Chilean citizens, the private 
system has been growing with respect to the 
numbers of beneficiaries and payers since its 
inception. As of 1997, 28.5 percent of Chileans 
were beneficiaries of the 34 Isapres comprising 
the private health care system. ("Complaints 
against Health Insurers ... ") Isapres are struc-
turally more similar to health maintenance 
organizations (managed care outfits) than to 
traditional private insurance companies in the 
United States. Like both traditional private 
insurance companies and many forms of man-
aged care, Isapres require a monthly premium 
and provide a fixed percentage of coverage of 
the cost of services rendered in hospitals and 
clinics. In general, like managed care, Isapres 
integrate the provision and financing of health 
care. Specifically, Isapres are more similar to 
managed care because they offer services from 
providers in a limited network. This limited 
network is composed of services within facili-
ties owned by the Isapres as well as services 
contracted with public and private providers. 
(Scarpaci, pp. 225-27; World Bank, p. 7) Isapres 
are classified as either open or closed. Open 
Isapres can enroll Chileans from any profession, 
whereas closed Isapres can only enroll Chileans 
from a specific profession1• 
The Current Financing of the Private 
Health Care System 
The main source of income for Isapres is 
the monthly premiums paid by beneficiaries. 
The cost of these premiums depends on the pol-
icy, but the average monthly premium as of 
1995 was U.S . $40. These premiums are 
financed through the seven percent payroll 
deduction, a two percent payroll contribution 
from employers, and co-payments made by ben-
eficiaries. In 1981, Law Decree 3626 allowed 
workers to transfer their mandatory seven per-
cent payroll deduction for health care coverage 
into any Isapre. (Scarpaci, p. 226) Employers 
who contribute the additional two percent of 
payroll to supplement employees' premiums 
receive a tax deduction from the central gov-
ernment for their contributions. As a result, 
this two percent contribution is considered a 
government subsidy for Isapres. ("Law Betters 
the Lot. .. ") The co-payments provided out-of-
pocket by beneficiaries vary from 10-40 percent 
of the cost of services. The cost of these co-pay-
ments depends on the amount of the seven per-
cent payroll deduction. Consequently, benefi-
ciaries with high incomes and, thus, high 
contributions through the 7 percent deduction 
may pay no co-payments. (World Bank, p. 7) 
Additional financing of Isapres arises from 
several subsidies provided by the central govern-
ment. The controversial two percent subsidy 
allows low income employees or employees with 
large families access to Isapres by supplement-
ing their premium contributions. Other gov-
ernment subsidies include funds for maternity 
leave payments as well as a free immunization 
program and nutritional supplements for all 
Chileans. (World Bank, p. 7) These subsidies help 
to lighten the financial burden placed onlsapres. 
1As of 1997, the three largest open lsapres were 
Consalud, Cruz Blanca, and Banmedica, and the three 
largest closed Isapres were Banco del Estado, El Teniente, 
and Istel. ("lsapres Receive U.S. $1.2 Billion") 
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Advantages and Problems of the 
Private System 
The advantages of the private system 
involve flexibility, the high quality of care, and 
the role of competition among /sapres. The 
flexibility of Chile's private health care system, 
in theory, allows citizens to choose the Isapre 
suited to their economic and health care needs. 
(Kritzer, p. 18) Additionally, the private system's 
flexibility allows beneficiaries access to both 
public and private health care providers within 
the Isapre network. ("Fonasa to Compete ... ") 
One major way the private system attracts 
potential beneficiaries is by offering high qual-
ity care. The high quality of care in the private 
system is evident through the acquisition of new 
technology and the maintenance of clinics and 
hospitals that provide patients with many 
amenities such as new and attractive facilities 
as well as private rooms in hospitals. (Aguila; 
Scarpaci, p. 226) Competition among Isapres 
for beneficiaries, in theory, drives down costs, 
thus allowing greater access to Isapres for those 
with lower incomes, and improves quality. 
Though the private system has some 
advantages, it also suffers from many problems. 
Most of the problems faced by the private sys-
tem relate to its restrictive practices. From the 
formation of Isapres in the 1980s until after 
1985, Isapre growth was slow. This slow growth 
was due, in part, to the early concentration of 
Isapre facilities in high income regions. As a 
result of the income disparity in Chile, there 
were only a small number of wealthy Chilean 
citizens. With such a limited pool of citizens to 
draw from, early Isapres could not make a sig-
nificant profit. Isapres also met early market-
ing resistance. Many potential users and 
providers had an aversion to making health care 
a market commodity. This aversion is still held 
by many Chilean providers today. An addition-
al reason for slow Isapre growth in the early 
1980's concerns competition with Fonasa's 
PPS. Fonasa's PPS provided the same quality 
of care in private facilities for lower prices. 
Slow Isapre growth can also be attributed to 
restrictive coverage, such as the refusal to cover 
women in the reproductive age (usually 
between the ages of 12 and 40). Restrictive cov-
erage limits the number of people who can 
qualify as beneficiaries. The restrictive prac-
tices of Isapres have been a chronic problem 
that persists today. (Scarpaci, pp. 228-30) 
After 1985, the number of beneficiaries 
enrolling in Isapres began to rapidly increase; 
however, this growth was to a large degree a 
result of state assistance. Beginning in 1981, 
the state began to support /sapre growth 
through various subsidies and policies. For 
example, the 1986 Health Law requiredFonasa 
to cover funds for medical and maternity leave 
payments. According to Dr. Vivienne Bachelet, 
a former doctor in Chile, "Isapres are techni-
cally bankrupt without the support of state sub-
sidies." (Bachelet) The current subsidies 
include the two percent subsidy contributed by 
employers and funds for maternity leave pay-
ments, as well as the free immunization pro-
gram and nutritional supplements for all 
Chileans. By covering many of Isapres' expens-
es, these subsidies improve Isapre profits. 
Additionally, the funds for maternity leave 
allowed Isapres to cover more women in the 
reproductive age, and the two percent subsidy 
allowed them to cover employees with lower 
incomes. As a result, the number of beneficia-
ries of Isapres increased. (Scarpaci, pp. 230-31) 
The most significant problem with the pri-
vate system today is restrictive coverage. This 
problem is grounded in the reality that Isapres 
are businesses, and health care is the commod-
ity being marketed. High-risk and high-cost 
beneficiaries are not good for business. As a 
result, such beneficiaries are either rejected 
from Isapre plans or forced to pay very high pre-
miums. Women in the reproductive age and the 
elderly are the beneficiaries most often subject-
ed to restrictive coverage. According to Isapre 
executives, a woman in the reproductive age can 
spend her entire life's contributions with just 
three pregnancies. ("Private Health Insurance 
Plans Restrict. .. ") If women in the reproduc-
tive age can provide an Isapre with proof that 
they are sterile, they will only be required to pay 
a premium equivalent to that for men of the 
same age. (Casas) Health care for the elderly is 
expensive because it requires more long-term 
care and high level technology. Consequently, 
the elderly are often rejected from Isapre plans 
or are forced to pay a much higher premium 
than younger beneficiaries. (Aguila) Another 
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way that Isapres strive to reduce their losses is 
through the refusal to cover catastrophic ill-
nesses such as cancer, serious heart problems, 
and AIDS. (Aguila) Catastrophic illnesses tend 
to require expensive long-term care. In short, 
the restrictive practices of Isapres increase prof-
it margins while greatly limiting access to the 
private system. One solution that would allow 
Isapres to be more inclusive while controlling 
costs is based upon a risk structure equalization 
scheme. In a risk structure equalization 
scheme, low risk/high income beneficiaries sub-
sidize high risk/low income beneficiaries. (World 
Bank, pp. 150-51) 
Access to Isapres is also limited due to 
income. Isapres set a minimum premium that 
beneficiaries must pay in order to obtain mini-
mum benefits. Chileans with high incomes are 
at an advantage in the private system since bet-
ter benefits can be attained by paying higher pre-
miums. Recently, Alejandro Ferreiro, the 
Superintendent of /sap res, claimed that for the 
first time in history Isapres were seeing a reduc-
tion in the number of beneficiaries. According 
to Ferreiro, the reduction is due to an increase in 
costs and fees for beneficiaries, since health care 
prices are rising faster than salaries. ("Isapres 
Affiliates Fall") This rise in costs has pushed 
many low income beneficiaries from the private 
system back to the public system. (Kritzer, p. 18) 
Chileans with access to Isapres are also 
confronted with problems hidden in the com-
plex wording and fine print of contracts. 2 The 
complexity of the contracts makes it very diffi-
cult for potential Isapre users to find a plan that 
truly fits their economic and health care needs. 
Many Chileans find following a serious opera-
tion that their Isapre does not cover as much 
of the hospital costs as they expected. (Aguila) 
The complaint process itself has Isapres acting 
as "judge and jury" and is so time consuming 
and complex that beneficiaries are often dis-
suaded from pursing complaints. ("Complaints 
Against Health Insurers ... ") 
2According to a 1997 report from the Superintendency 
of Isapres, which oversees the operation of Isapres, most 
complaints from Isapre users involved issues of exactly what 
services were covered, the level of co-pay required, and cal-
culations of reimbursements. Most beneficiaries of Isapres 
complained that their benefits were too low. ("Complaints 
against Health Insurers .. . ") 
Another controversial problem in the pri-
vate system involves the "guarantee check" 
required for treatment in private hospitals. The 
"guarantee check" is simply a signed blank 
check that patients must supply when they are 
admitted into a private hospital. If patients can-
not supply such a check, they do not receive 
service. Even beneficiaries of Isapres must sup-
ply a blank check to receive treatment at pri-
vate hospitals. The controversy surrounding 
the checks has erupted from emergency situa-
tions where patients requiring urgent treat-
ment were turned away from private hospitals, 
since they did not have a check. For example, 
in 1997, a two-year-old boy died from acute 
appendicitis when he was turned away from a 
private hospital since his family did not have a 
check with them. In addition, in 1998 a man 
died from cardiac arrest after being turned away 
from a private hospital for not having a check. 
("Mayors Prepare ... "; "Girardi Proposes ... ") 
Isapres attract potential beneficiaries by 
offering high quality care. In the long term, pro-
viding high quality care through high level tech-
nology and amenities is very costly. A possible 
solution to this problem is to have Isapres hire 
providers to provide services to their beneficia-
ries alone. Isapres would thus have more con-
trol over the provision of services to ensure cost-
effective utilization. (World Bank, p. 130) lsapres 
currently contract with the public sector for use 
of facilities and equipment to help reduce invest-
ment costs. As competition among Isapres 
increases, the need to advance quality by acquir-
ing new technology and facilities increases in 
order to attract and maintain beneficiaries. As a 
result, investment costs will increase. Again, by 
directly hiring providers, Isapres can help con-
trol these costs. (World Bank, p. 134) 
Reforms and Proposals 
Unlike the public system, few reforms and 
proposals of the private system have been men-
tioned in the news headlines of recent years. In 
1995, a law was passed principally for the benefit 
of Isapres. This law allowed Isapres to reject 
claims from beneficiaries for coverage of pre-
existing conditions. The law also required pun-
ishment by imprisonment for those who commit 
insurance fraud. Overall, the law helped /sapres 
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deal with two issues that can be a financial drain. 
("Law Betters Lot of Health Insurance ... ") 
In 1997, the Health Minister, Alex 
Figueroa, called for the urgent passage of a bill 
that would eliminate the "guarantee check" 
requirement for private hospitals. In October 
1998, the Party for Democracy Deputy, Guido 
Girardi, proposed to modify this bill. Girardi's 
modification was to have /sapres cover the full 
cost of treatment in private hospitals. Girardi's 
justification for this modification was based 
upon the claim that insufficient coverage of 
beneficiaries enrolled in Isapres has forced 
many beneficiaries to return to the public sys-
tem when they can no longer afford the cost of 
services in the private system. Girardi claimed 
that this mass return of beneficiaries to the 
public system is a drain on the system's 
resources and believes that having Isapres cover 
the full cost of treatment in private hospitals 
will secure the resources for low income 
Chileans who must use the public system. 
("Girardi Proposes ... ") 
Conclusion 
The goal of the political right and some 
wealthy citizens is to continue what Pinochet 
began in the 1980s by completely privatizing 
health care in Chile. This privatized system 
would be a move from the current hybrid sys-
tem of health care in Chile to a system mirrored 
after health care in the United States. Under a 
privatized system, all citizens in Chile would be 
members of Isapres. The theory behind com-
plete privatization is that the health care sys-
tem can be maintained through market strate-
gies. As Isapres compete for beneficiaries, the 
costs of care should decrease and the quality of 
care should increase. To successfully make 
such a transition; Chile would have to develop 
a system analogous to Medicaid in the United 
States to cover citizens who cannot afford the 
premiums of any Isapres. (Aguilo) 
On the other hand, the goal of the politi-
cal center and left, of most providers, and of 
many citizens is to return to the days before 
Pinochet by completely nationalizing health 
care in Chile. Most proponents of complete 
nationalization have an aversion to making 
health care a market commodity, arguing that 
health care is a service and not a good. The 
nationalized system would be a move from the 
current hybrid system to a system mirrored 
after health care in England. Under such a sys-
tem, all Isapres would be eliminated. The 
decentralized structure of the public health care 
system would be maintained, since decentral-
ization allows health care to better respond to 
local needs. Interestingly (and ironically), 
Pinochet recently was arrested while in 
England recovering from back surgery in a 
London hospital. The dictator who sparked the 
privatization of Chile's health care system 
believed he could get better medical treatment 
under England's nationalized system of health 
care. It is unknown whether complete privati-
zation, complete nationalization, or the current 
hybrid system will prevail in the future. This 
issue will likely be a deciding factor in the next 
presidential election in Chile. (Aguilo) 
Those who must decide the future of 
health care in Chile must be conscious of the 
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importance of maintaining a properly func-
tioning health care system. The key to a prop-
erly functioning health care system is finding 
the right balance between cost control and the 
provision of adequate care. When cost man-
agement is too stringent, as in the restrictive 
practices of /sap res, services and access to serv-
ices are limited. As a result, the provision of 
adequate care is compromised to maintain 
costs. On the other hand, when cost manage-
ment is too lax, as seen in some cases for both 
the private and public systems of Chile, the cost 
of health care can skyrocket. When costs 
become too high, the provision of adequate care 
is again compromised in the long-term, as 
health care payers struggle to maintain their 
financial well-being. In addition to finding the 
right balance between cost control and provi-
sion of care, a health care system must be able 
to adapt to a nation's changing conditions to 
adequately serve the needs of the people. 
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